"Identity crisis"
Drewer, Brant, New Scientist, 27 February 1999
http://technology.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg16121754.500&print=true
Before investigators can even begin looking for suspects for a crime such as murder, it’s often important to be able to identify the victim. Sometimes all that is found are the skull and bones of the deceased. DNA analysis reveals nothing, dental analysis also fails to yield a missing person. In these circumstances, police resort to a technique known as forensics facial reconstruction to yield and photograph of what the deceased might have looked like.
Facial reconstruction as a technique to create 3-D facial approximations was first used by Welcker (1883). His (1895) was credited with advancing the technique as well as collecting data for the first table on average facial tissue thickness. This technique finds its origin in Biological anthropology and archaeology where it is still in use. Not till the mid 1960’s Wilton Krogman popularize the facial reconstruction in the field of forensics.
Two types of facial reconstuction exist today: two-dimensional and three-dimensional. 2D facial reconstructions are hand-drawn created from ante-mortem photographs and the skull. Tissue depth markers are place along the skull and photgraphs are taken. Drawing are done on a material known as Vellum. Computer programs F.A.C.E and C.A.R.E.S are now capable of creating 2D facial constructions much quicker .
3D facial reconstructions can be done in clay or under the computer. Construction with clay is a very slow and meticulous process, that begins with the creation of a plaster cast of the skull. Landmarks which correspond to particular spots on the unidentified skull are marked off on the cast. These sites represent the average facial tissue thickness for people of the same sex, race, and age as that of the remains. Next facial muscles are layered on the cast, followed by soft tissue of the neck, nose and then the lips. Muscles of facial expression and the soft tissue around the eyes, the ears are added next. Much fine tuning is done afterwards and finally a layer of flesh is added to mimic the skin. (To see a more complete and detailed procedure, search Taylor and Angel: Craniofacial Identification in Forensic Medicine, pgs 177-185)
Newer technology, described in the above article, “replaces knives with computers… and clay with a facial template.” This method is significantly faster than using clay and is more flexible(easier to modify.) First off, the skull is placed on a rotating table. A laser is projected on to the skull while it rotates. Ttwo cameras record the changing contours as the laser passes over the subject. Computers then triangulate the data collected by the cameras and creates a 3D image. Virtual pegs are place around the 3D image of the skull to delineate tissue depth. A facial template is then applied to the skull. At the Human Identification Centre of the University of Glasgow, the team of forensic pathologist choose from 200 templates: digitised faces of men and women, of different ages, build and race.
Finding the a suitable template is important because if the skull does not match the template. The template will become overstretched and this will cause distortions. To combat this problem, the team above aims to collect 3D Images of live people’s faces and their skulls from CT, MRI and ultrasound. With these images, researchers will try to calculate the distance between landmarks on the face and the skull. With this data technicians will be able to find a facial template for an unidentified skull based on calculated values rather than mere visual comparison. Through this same project they hope also to create a larger databases of facial templates.
Following matching a template, finer musculature is added and finally, the nose, the lips and the ears are added. These last three facial features are very difficult to recreate. Soft tissue degrades first thus no remants of these parts are usually found with the bones. Questions such as how long a person nose is? Did he/she smile much or were they generally angry of depressed are difficult and important questions to be tackled. Further study must be done. Creating a larger database of facial templates will hopefully reveal relationships between bone alignment/arrangement and the shape and size of the facial features that are more difficult to place.
Facial reconstruction continues to improve as technique that estimates what individuals may look like. More sophisticated computer algorithms will create more accurate reconstructions of individuals that otherwise have no other identification. Expert in the field generally agree that facial reconstruction will remain a tool for recognition and not identification. It will continue to provide a spark by creating a possible link between victim and family and friends but ulitmately other forensic techniques such as DNA analysis are needed to confirm identity.
For more information on:
3D -graphs see: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6T6W-3YGDCHC-1-N&_cdi=5041&_user=489286&_orig=search&_coverDate=02%2F14%2F2000&_sk=998919997&view=c&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkzk&md5=92f014e15ea6b5e1b8a7d7c951149129&ie=/sdarticle.pdf
Advance statistical modeling:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6T6W-4JGJJ88-5-R&_cdi=5041&_user=489286&_orig=search&_coverDate=05%2F15%2F2006&_sk=998409999.8998&view=c&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkWz&md5=707a502a4c1f4d9efc8ece8952a58174&ie=/sdarticle.pdf
Tuesday, November 13, 2007
Polygraphs and lie detectors
"The limits of the polygraph"
Faigman, David L, Issues in Science in Technology, Fall 2003;
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3622/is_200310/ai_n9343906/print
Polygraph test, lie detectors are given more credit than they deserve in television and even by technicians, and politicians. CSI and similar shows lead us, the public, to believe in the validity and accuracy of many forensics tools. The truth is that these highly toted tools are actually a lot less reliable than purported. A review article in the Fall 2003 issue of Issues in Science and Technology states that many courts at all levels are precluding many identification techniques on the bases that they are not found rigorous scientific evidence. With exception to the scientifically seasoned DNA analysis, “Fingerprinting, fiber analysis, hair analysis, ballistics, bite marks, etc…” have all come under questions for lack of scientific foundation.
In the same issue of Issues in Science and Technology, author David Faigman, looks at the use of polygraphs in law enforcement and national security. As a decisive tool, the polygraph is limited to questions that demand a straightforward answer. For example, “Did you see the victim on Sunday?” This questions is black and white and thus there is no confusion, the polygraph is very accurate in these situations However for screening, such as detecting a spy or a member of a terrorist organization, questions may no revolve around a specific event. And so the questions are generic. “Did you ever reveal classified information to and unauthorized personnel?” It may be unclear to an examinee whether a particular activities “justifies” a yes answer, so he may feel like he’s lying even though he’s providing a truthful response.
Allegations of espionage by Wen Ho Lee, a nuclear scientist at Department of Energy’s Los Alamos National laboratory, cause many of his colleagues to be subsequently subjected to polygraph test. This sparked Congress to ask the National Research Council to study the polygraph testing’s ability. To distinguish accurately between lying and truth-telling across variety of setting and examinee, even in the face of countermeasures.
1st they examined the scientific bases of underlying the physiological measures of the polygraph. Despite its ability to detect psychological states associated with deception, similar results were obtained for people merely anxious about being tested.
The committee collected all available published and unpublished data on the accuracy of polygraph tests. They found the quality of studies to be low in general. Furthermore they found testing methods to be inherently flawed. Laboratory studies suffered from lack of realism: less variation in test implementation, in characteristics of examinees and in the nature and context. Generally, the limited scopes of these experiments lead to overestimates in the accuracy of polygraph tests. Field studies are limited by the difficulty in determining the truth against which test results could be compared. Moreover, they were not conducted in a double-blind control study. Examiners had prior knowledge of the case and often the cases outcome would be affected by the examination. Biases inherent to these studies made it difficult to obtain the objective truth.
Hypothetical studies were conducted using computer for security screening applications and crimination investigation. Polygraph tests were conducted in two different modes: Suspicious (more sensitive) and friendly(less sensitive). In both security screening and criminal investigation, suspicious mode yields more positive results, more guilty/spies but it also created more false positives (innocent who failed the test). In friendly, few innocent people were wrongfully accused but the large majority of guilty/spies would pass the test.
Despite the inaccuracy of polygraph tests and high chance of errors, it is still used as a investigative tool on grounds that it produces accurate results, and the it deters people on the premise that they believe that deception may be revealed by the test.
Faigman also discusses the potential issue of polygraph tests use in post-conviction sex-offender maintenance. In 30 states, as part of their probation program sex offenders must submit them to periodic polygraph tests. Examinees are often asked questions surrounding “sexually deviant” or “high risk” behavior, such as the use of alcohol or drugs, sexually activity with a consenting adult, or “masturbation to deviant fantasy,” rather than on the detection of actual sex crimes or other violations of the terms of parole. This testing is based on presumption that legal but “undesirable behaviors are indicators of illegal activity. Faigman says that there is no evidence that a “failed” polygraph test is an actual indicator of concealed sex crimes and that there is no scientific bases for using the polygraph as a management of treatment tool for sexual offenders.
The polygraph test is not very accurate that much is clear. It often works on the threat that it will reveal the truth. False positives and false negative are serious risks which make polygraphs unreliable. From a scientific standpoint polygraph holds little ground. They should as Faigman says be used with great caution, if at all in courts.
However, the current stance of the government is can we afford not to be cautious or not use the polygraphs. Even if a number of innocent are found guilty is not worth it to find that 1 person who might cause massive destruction or is not worth it to be more cautious to a former sex offender. In such cases, most people I feel would rather on the side of caution. While the prosecution, courts, and the government continue to use the polygraph test, new more accurate technology which is base on rigorous scientific testing must be developed.
Faigman, David L, Issues in Science in Technology, Fall 2003;
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3622/is_200310/ai_n9343906/print
Polygraph test, lie detectors are given more credit than they deserve in television and even by technicians, and politicians. CSI and similar shows lead us, the public, to believe in the validity and accuracy of many forensics tools. The truth is that these highly toted tools are actually a lot less reliable than purported. A review article in the Fall 2003 issue of Issues in Science and Technology states that many courts at all levels are precluding many identification techniques on the bases that they are not found rigorous scientific evidence. With exception to the scientifically seasoned DNA analysis, “Fingerprinting, fiber analysis, hair analysis, ballistics, bite marks, etc…” have all come under questions for lack of scientific foundation.
In the same issue of Issues in Science and Technology, author David Faigman, looks at the use of polygraphs in law enforcement and national security. As a decisive tool, the polygraph is limited to questions that demand a straightforward answer. For example, “Did you see the victim on Sunday?” This questions is black and white and thus there is no confusion, the polygraph is very accurate in these situations However for screening, such as detecting a spy or a member of a terrorist organization, questions may no revolve around a specific event. And so the questions are generic. “Did you ever reveal classified information to and unauthorized personnel?” It may be unclear to an examinee whether a particular activities “justifies” a yes answer, so he may feel like he’s lying even though he’s providing a truthful response.
Allegations of espionage by Wen Ho Lee, a nuclear scientist at Department of Energy’s Los Alamos National laboratory, cause many of his colleagues to be subsequently subjected to polygraph test. This sparked Congress to ask the National Research Council to study the polygraph testing’s ability. To distinguish accurately between lying and truth-telling across variety of setting and examinee, even in the face of countermeasures.
1st they examined the scientific bases of underlying the physiological measures of the polygraph. Despite its ability to detect psychological states associated with deception, similar results were obtained for people merely anxious about being tested.
The committee collected all available published and unpublished data on the accuracy of polygraph tests. They found the quality of studies to be low in general. Furthermore they found testing methods to be inherently flawed. Laboratory studies suffered from lack of realism: less variation in test implementation, in characteristics of examinees and in the nature and context. Generally, the limited scopes of these experiments lead to overestimates in the accuracy of polygraph tests. Field studies are limited by the difficulty in determining the truth against which test results could be compared. Moreover, they were not conducted in a double-blind control study. Examiners had prior knowledge of the case and often the cases outcome would be affected by the examination. Biases inherent to these studies made it difficult to obtain the objective truth.
Hypothetical studies were conducted using computer for security screening applications and crimination investigation. Polygraph tests were conducted in two different modes: Suspicious (more sensitive) and friendly(less sensitive). In both security screening and criminal investigation, suspicious mode yields more positive results, more guilty/spies but it also created more false positives (innocent who failed the test). In friendly, few innocent people were wrongfully accused but the large majority of guilty/spies would pass the test.
Despite the inaccuracy of polygraph tests and high chance of errors, it is still used as a investigative tool on grounds that it produces accurate results, and the it deters people on the premise that they believe that deception may be revealed by the test.
Faigman also discusses the potential issue of polygraph tests use in post-conviction sex-offender maintenance. In 30 states, as part of their probation program sex offenders must submit them to periodic polygraph tests. Examinees are often asked questions surrounding “sexually deviant” or “high risk” behavior, such as the use of alcohol or drugs, sexually activity with a consenting adult, or “masturbation to deviant fantasy,” rather than on the detection of actual sex crimes or other violations of the terms of parole. This testing is based on presumption that legal but “undesirable behaviors are indicators of illegal activity. Faigman says that there is no evidence that a “failed” polygraph test is an actual indicator of concealed sex crimes and that there is no scientific bases for using the polygraph as a management of treatment tool for sexual offenders.
The polygraph test is not very accurate that much is clear. It often works on the threat that it will reveal the truth. False positives and false negative are serious risks which make polygraphs unreliable. From a scientific standpoint polygraph holds little ground. They should as Faigman says be used with great caution, if at all in courts.
However, the current stance of the government is can we afford not to be cautious or not use the polygraphs. Even if a number of innocent are found guilty is not worth it to find that 1 person who might cause massive destruction or is not worth it to be more cautious to a former sex offender. In such cases, most people I feel would rather on the side of caution. While the prosecution, courts, and the government continue to use the polygraph test, new more accurate technology which is base on rigorous scientific testing must be developed.
I sure hope terrorists don't like sunglasses
I think the subject of face-recognition technology, which Chris called attention to in his post about biometrics, deserves consideration of the viewpoint of the independent press, and not just the military, though I am grateful to Chris for calling attention to this subject with that post. This 2002 Wired Magazine article chronicles some of the (extremely problematic) flaws of such a technology.
Airports have been calling for face-recognition technology to scan for terrorists and other suspected bad guys in security lines since September 11 and even before. But what seems like the golden bullet for aviation security is not yet anything to get excited about, because it doesn't work.
You'll notice that while the Department of Homeland Security has a budget of $46 billion for FY 2008 (see the official DHS budget) and spends a great chunk of that on airport security, you haven't seen facial-recognition technology adopted. It's been tested many times, but it has failed.
At Palm Beach International Airport, where the technology was being tested, the computer failed to recognize airport employees 53 percent of the time. How could the computer possibly pick out a terrorist, even one whose face was known to the NSA (a hopeful assumption), at a checkpoint that millions of non-terrorists pass through every year? Right now, it's conceivable that the technology would sound the alarm dozens of times daily because grandpa has similar eyebrows to Osama bin Laden while almost certainly missing an actual terrorist.
(Nevermind the very non-trivial concerns of the American Civil Liberties Union that we ought to think twice about whether we want the government to do something like this.)
Internet privacy and security consultant Richard Smith, based in Brookline, Mass., analyzed whether this technology was "ready for prime time." His findings (In short, "no.") should be sobering to anyone who thinks this technology is anywhere close to being so.
The technology works by converting a continuous video stream of faces and converting it to digital stills. The computer then compares the faces with a database, sounding the alarm if a close match is made. The problem? The system is incredibly fussy. Sunglasses--even regular glasses--can completely throw the system, which uses eyes as anchor points.
The setup that would need to be implemented at an airport security checkpoint for the system to have any chance at working, according to Smith, would be a special walkway where lighting is "strictly controlled," with cameras at head height and passengers looking straight ahead, having removed their sunglasses and hats. That's not so hard to imagine (it hardly sounds that much more inconvenient than removing one's shoes), and DHS would certainly pay for the upgrade, which would require all new security cameras, among other things. But even if this technology were perfected a few years down the road and such a "walkway" system were implemented nationwide, there remains the problem of matching these faces to terrorists.
The real NSA is not like the Counter-Terrorist Unit of Fox's extremely right-wing (though very cool) television show "24," which seems to have every imaginable technological absurdity at its disposal. As Smith points out, it's not easy to put together a "terrorist database." Some reasons why:
1. We don't usually know who the terrorists are (Only 2 of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, were known to the CIA and FBI, and the agencies only had a photo of the latter.)
2. Terrorists don't participate in photo line-ups.
3. Both Alhazmi and Almihdhar has US Visas and had entered the US legally twice before September 11th.
But Smith's best reason why a technology like this is a waste of time and money in trying to find even the limited number of known terrorists like Alhazmi, those who have portrait-quality photos available on MySpace and are courteous enough not to wear a hat indoors, is this: you can find Nasaf Alhazmi in the White Pages.
Airports have been calling for face-recognition technology to scan for terrorists and other suspected bad guys in security lines since September 11 and even before. But what seems like the golden bullet for aviation security is not yet anything to get excited about, because it doesn't work.
You'll notice that while the Department of Homeland Security has a budget of $46 billion for FY 2008 (see the official DHS budget) and spends a great chunk of that on airport security, you haven't seen facial-recognition technology adopted. It's been tested many times, but it has failed.
At Palm Beach International Airport, where the technology was being tested, the computer failed to recognize airport employees 53 percent of the time. How could the computer possibly pick out a terrorist, even one whose face was known to the NSA (a hopeful assumption), at a checkpoint that millions of non-terrorists pass through every year? Right now, it's conceivable that the technology would sound the alarm dozens of times daily because grandpa has similar eyebrows to Osama bin Laden while almost certainly missing an actual terrorist.
(Nevermind the very non-trivial concerns of the American Civil Liberties Union that we ought to think twice about whether we want the government to do something like this.)
Internet privacy and security consultant Richard Smith, based in Brookline, Mass., analyzed whether this technology was "ready for prime time." His findings (In short, "no.") should be sobering to anyone who thinks this technology is anywhere close to being so.
The technology works by converting a continuous video stream of faces and converting it to digital stills. The computer then compares the faces with a database, sounding the alarm if a close match is made. The problem? The system is incredibly fussy. Sunglasses--even regular glasses--can completely throw the system, which uses eyes as anchor points.
The setup that would need to be implemented at an airport security checkpoint for the system to have any chance at working, according to Smith, would be a special walkway where lighting is "strictly controlled," with cameras at head height and passengers looking straight ahead, having removed their sunglasses and hats. That's not so hard to imagine (it hardly sounds that much more inconvenient than removing one's shoes), and DHS would certainly pay for the upgrade, which would require all new security cameras, among other things. But even if this technology were perfected a few years down the road and such a "walkway" system were implemented nationwide, there remains the problem of matching these faces to terrorists.
The real NSA is not like the Counter-Terrorist Unit of Fox's extremely right-wing (though very cool) television show "24," which seems to have every imaginable technological absurdity at its disposal. As Smith points out, it's not easy to put together a "terrorist database." Some reasons why:
1. We don't usually know who the terrorists are (Only 2 of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, were known to the CIA and FBI, and the agencies only had a photo of the latter.)
2. Terrorists don't participate in photo line-ups.
3. Both Alhazmi and Almihdhar has US Visas and had entered the US legally twice before September 11th.
But Smith's best reason why a technology like this is a waste of time and money in trying to find even the limited number of known terrorists like Alhazmi, those who have portrait-quality photos available on MySpace and are courteous enough not to wear a hat indoors, is this: you can find Nasaf Alhazmi in the White Pages.
The use of PCR in Forensic DNA Analysis
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/forensics.shtml
I have been researching the uses of biotechnology in Forensics and have come upon some very useful information in regards to how decades old DNA can be restored. In the past, DNA that had been improperly stored or stored for too long had a good chance of degrading and becoming useless to the law enforcement community. This however, due to some recent innovation in the last few years is almost a thing of the past.
Years ago a sample of DNA the size of a quarter was required to get accurate incriminating information. Now with PCR or Polymerase Chain Reaction analysis we can take very minute amounts (a matter of a few skin cells) and even degraded samples of DNA and amplify them. This process works by heating the DNA, denaturing its proteins and then allowing it to cool in the presence of a polymerase, which replicates the DNA. This process is done repeatedly until sufficient genetic material has been produced. Since DNA is produced by a system of exact copies the new material is just like the old in every way.
This innovation has allowed the re-opening of many cold cases in which the evidence had been unable to be analysed in the past. I believe this to be a great benefit to the justice system in that previous evidence that was once considered unusable but would have saved someone jail time or put a criminal behind bars can now be recovered and properly analysed.
I do not know of any controversy as of yet with this process other than the statute of limitations laws are currently under scrutiny because of the new ability to recover once lost evidence. There are now states who are changing the statute of limitations to start upon the discovery of new DNA evidence. I think overall that this technology is more of a boon than a bane. I hope that someday, evidence once stored on a shelf thought to be too degraded for use in court may be of use due to this technology and that justice will be served.
I have been researching the uses of biotechnology in Forensics and have come upon some very useful information in regards to how decades old DNA can be restored. In the past, DNA that had been improperly stored or stored for too long had a good chance of degrading and becoming useless to the law enforcement community. This however, due to some recent innovation in the last few years is almost a thing of the past.
Years ago a sample of DNA the size of a quarter was required to get accurate incriminating information. Now with PCR or Polymerase Chain Reaction analysis we can take very minute amounts (a matter of a few skin cells) and even degraded samples of DNA and amplify them. This process works by heating the DNA, denaturing its proteins and then allowing it to cool in the presence of a polymerase, which replicates the DNA. This process is done repeatedly until sufficient genetic material has been produced. Since DNA is produced by a system of exact copies the new material is just like the old in every way.
This innovation has allowed the re-opening of many cold cases in which the evidence had been unable to be analysed in the past. I believe this to be a great benefit to the justice system in that previous evidence that was once considered unusable but would have saved someone jail time or put a criminal behind bars can now be recovered and properly analysed.
I do not know of any controversy as of yet with this process other than the statute of limitations laws are currently under scrutiny because of the new ability to recover once lost evidence. There are now states who are changing the statute of limitations to start upon the discovery of new DNA evidence. I think overall that this technology is more of a boon than a bane. I hope that someday, evidence once stored on a shelf thought to be too degraded for use in court may be of use due to this technology and that justice will be served.
Biometrics and the War on Crime
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=24912
I was researching future uses of biotechnology in the war on crime and I came across this article on the use of biometrics in fighting crime. Until now, I thought we were limited by the use of DNA or fingerprints but that is soon going to change. Today with the aid of computers we can now use more than just DNA and fingerprints but we can use your face, retina image, voice and gait while walking to identify a person.
This technology has already proven itself in detaining terrorists that try to constantly change their appearance to get by security. One example which occurred in Iraq, was a man that had been detained for questionable activity but was later let go. Before his release his biometrics were recorded. 10 months later the same man tried to pass by security forces with an altered appearance and ID and was caught do to his inability to fool this technology.
I believe this technology may help the public rest a bit easier knowing that a terrorist will be unable to use just a fake ID to get on a plane or enter a secured building. The government is pushing that in 2008 we all have an ID or drivers license that meets minimum federal guidelines on security issues. One of these options may be a license that has encoded information on it that says this ID belongs to you and only you by reference to a mix of biometric data such as DNA, Fingerprints and retina scan. The typical airport check-in may go something like this. You show up to get your tickets and you have to scan your license and then have a machine do a quick fingerprint and retina check. Once verified to be you the tickets are then tagged with your biometrics to prevent someone else from using them and to allow the boarding pass collector to scan you again on boarding. Since the ID will not be transferable and it must be encoded by the local government it will be much more unlikely to have a fake ID that will give you access to a plane.
With this technology we will be able to identify and prevent people from entering and exiting the country, who would otherwise cause harm. The current proposals may dictate that all foreign nationals entering the country have their biometrics taken and kept on file. They must enter and exit the country through these checkpoints to give our government and security forces a better idea of who is travelling in and out of the country.
This new technology does however bring about the question of privacy. Many everyday people will not want to be profiled and consider this technology as another way for big brother to watch them. I can sympathize with them but I can personally attest to the fact that seeing a strange person taking pictures of my ship while I was in the Navy and asking if it was leaving anytime soon was quite nerve racking. I think this technology would help us identify possible threats before they have time to commit to them. Just imagine another use would be to reunite kidnapped or missing children with their families before large amounts of time have gone by. Technology is a wonderful thing if used for good. Lets hope that this technology will help save lives and our freedoms.
I was researching future uses of biotechnology in the war on crime and I came across this article on the use of biometrics in fighting crime. Until now, I thought we were limited by the use of DNA or fingerprints but that is soon going to change. Today with the aid of computers we can now use more than just DNA and fingerprints but we can use your face, retina image, voice and gait while walking to identify a person.
This technology has already proven itself in detaining terrorists that try to constantly change their appearance to get by security. One example which occurred in Iraq, was a man that had been detained for questionable activity but was later let go. Before his release his biometrics were recorded. 10 months later the same man tried to pass by security forces with an altered appearance and ID and was caught do to his inability to fool this technology.
I believe this technology may help the public rest a bit easier knowing that a terrorist will be unable to use just a fake ID to get on a plane or enter a secured building. The government is pushing that in 2008 we all have an ID or drivers license that meets minimum federal guidelines on security issues. One of these options may be a license that has encoded information on it that says this ID belongs to you and only you by reference to a mix of biometric data such as DNA, Fingerprints and retina scan. The typical airport check-in may go something like this. You show up to get your tickets and you have to scan your license and then have a machine do a quick fingerprint and retina check. Once verified to be you the tickets are then tagged with your biometrics to prevent someone else from using them and to allow the boarding pass collector to scan you again on boarding. Since the ID will not be transferable and it must be encoded by the local government it will be much more unlikely to have a fake ID that will give you access to a plane.
With this technology we will be able to identify and prevent people from entering and exiting the country, who would otherwise cause harm. The current proposals may dictate that all foreign nationals entering the country have their biometrics taken and kept on file. They must enter and exit the country through these checkpoints to give our government and security forces a better idea of who is travelling in and out of the country.
This new technology does however bring about the question of privacy. Many everyday people will not want to be profiled and consider this technology as another way for big brother to watch them. I can sympathize with them but I can personally attest to the fact that seeing a strange person taking pictures of my ship while I was in the Navy and asking if it was leaving anytime soon was quite nerve racking. I think this technology would help us identify possible threats before they have time to commit to them. Just imagine another use would be to reunite kidnapped or missing children with their families before large amounts of time have gone by. Technology is a wonderful thing if used for good. Lets hope that this technology will help save lives and our freedoms.
The use of DNA to solve criminal cases.
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194197.pdf
I was researching the topic of forensics in biotechnology and the uses of DNA in criminal investigations and I came across this report from the attorney generals office on using DNA to solve cold cases. I must admit that all I knew before this, of how DNA is used in investigations came from TV sitcoms like CSI.
I spent some time going over the article and found it to be most informative. Today DNA is almost a common household acronym but only about 20 years ago was it just starting to get serious attention from the law enforcement community. Today thanks to PCR, we can use DNA that is decades old much like finger prints to track down criminals with the aid of information technology systems such as CODIS.
CODIS or the Combined DNA Index System which is operated by the FBI acts like a library for DNA evidence collected at crime scenes. The great thing about this is that once information is entered, participating states and local authorities can compare their DNA samples to the database and look for matches. This allowed one case in which a man was raping women and burning their houses down to be caught and brought to justice. The man was arrested in another city for firing a gun in public which then required that his DNA be entered into CODIS. This entry set off the alarm that he was involved in more than just a public disturbance.
I believe that this technology will help bring justice to many and that the public will greatly appreciate the ability to remove the doubt of conviction. This system not only has put people behind bars but has freed people from prison as well. There has been some debate though, as with any technology, its only as good as the people who are trained to use it. Contamination of evidence and older samples are often too degraded to use. These problems however are becoming less persistent as the technology gets better.
I think this is a great advance and that it will only get better. I do however hope that this technology wont be used to watch the general populace. I believe that the more technological the justice system becomes that the better off we will be. No more will a confused and scared "eye witness" be able to convince a jury of convicting when good DNA evidence says other words. Technology may be cold but it doesn't make mistakes like people. Lets make this technology more available to law enforcement across the country. Lets integrate biotechnology with the law.
I was researching the topic of forensics in biotechnology and the uses of DNA in criminal investigations and I came across this report from the attorney generals office on using DNA to solve cold cases. I must admit that all I knew before this, of how DNA is used in investigations came from TV sitcoms like CSI.
I spent some time going over the article and found it to be most informative. Today DNA is almost a common household acronym but only about 20 years ago was it just starting to get serious attention from the law enforcement community. Today thanks to PCR, we can use DNA that is decades old much like finger prints to track down criminals with the aid of information technology systems such as CODIS.
CODIS or the Combined DNA Index System which is operated by the FBI acts like a library for DNA evidence collected at crime scenes. The great thing about this is that once information is entered, participating states and local authorities can compare their DNA samples to the database and look for matches. This allowed one case in which a man was raping women and burning their houses down to be caught and brought to justice. The man was arrested in another city for firing a gun in public which then required that his DNA be entered into CODIS. This entry set off the alarm that he was involved in more than just a public disturbance.
I believe that this technology will help bring justice to many and that the public will greatly appreciate the ability to remove the doubt of conviction. This system not only has put people behind bars but has freed people from prison as well. There has been some debate though, as with any technology, its only as good as the people who are trained to use it. Contamination of evidence and older samples are often too degraded to use. These problems however are becoming less persistent as the technology gets better.
I think this is a great advance and that it will only get better. I do however hope that this technology wont be used to watch the general populace. I believe that the more technological the justice system becomes that the better off we will be. No more will a confused and scared "eye witness" be able to convince a jury of convicting when good DNA evidence says other words. Technology may be cold but it doesn't make mistakes like people. Lets make this technology more available to law enforcement across the country. Lets integrate biotechnology with the law.
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